Galwan to Kashmir: What distinguishes intelligence from response failures?

On June 15, 2020, the Indian Army was taken by surprise as its troops clashed with the Chinese Army on the Galwan heights, in Ladakh. At least 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers were killed in the first fatal clash between the two countries in more than three decades. Was this an instance of intelligence failure?

Accusations of intelligence failure as explanations for military surprises tend to come from retired military officials and political opponents in the aftermath of incidents and crises. The reaction of governments, when faced with such surprises, is usually to remain silent and let the intelligence agencies take the blame. Deviating from this norm, following the Galwan incident, the current Indian government denied that there was any intelligence failure. Therefore, it is pertinent to ask from an independent standpoint, was there really an intelligence failure? Contrary to some scholars, I argue that the surprise at Galwan was not an intelligence failure, but a response failure.

The Galwan surprise is comparable to the Kargil surprise. In 1999, Pakistani troops, initially disguised as militants, occupied vast swathes of land in the Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir. Their aim was to cut off Indian access to a vital road in the region. What made the invasion possible was…

Read more